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TYPE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION SUBJECT TO
CONTROL BY CERTIORARI
Next to the writ of mandamus, which is the most versatile and
frequently applied means of judicial control of administrative
action in Minnesota, ranks the writ of certiorari in importance
as a method of judicial review by means of the extraordinary
remedies. As a matter of fact, owing to the constant expansion of
governmental functions coupled with the development of modern
administrative techniques the field controlled by certiorari gradual-
ly seems to outstrip in significance that reserved to its rival
mandamus. "
The appropriateness of certiorari as a means of judicial con-
trol of administrative action in Minnesota is essentially predicated
on the fact that the supreme court has not confined this remedy
to its narrow and technical common law "office," but has con-
strued the statutory writ as "a certiorari with increased scope.""- 3
This increased scope manifests itself both in respect to the
type of action subject to control by certiorari and to the extent of
control in the cases where it is available. The first aspect of this
*For prior installment see 33 Minn. L. Rev. 569 (1949).
**Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
***Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
****Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
223. The Minnesota Central R. R. Co. v. McNamara, 13 Minn. 508, 513
(1868).
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extension will be in connection with the subject of the present
subsection while the second remains reserved for discussion in
the following subsection.
1. Necessity of an administrative action of quasi-judicial
character.
In the absence of a specific statutory provision modifying the
general rule certiorari will lie to review administrative action of a
"quasi-judicial" character. In that respect Minnesota follows the
general trend of Anglo-American law which has gradually, though
commencing at a comparatively early date, 22 4 expanded the scope
of the writ.
The leading Minnesota case on that point is In re Wilson, in
which Mr. Justice Mitchell made the following statement:
"Originally, and in English practice, a certiorari was an original
writ issuing out of the court of chancery or king's bench, directed
to the judges or officers of an inferior court, commanding them
to certify or return the records or proceedings in a cause before
them, for the purpose of a judicial review of their action. In the
United States, the office of this writ has been extended, and its
application is not now confined to the decision of courts, properly
so called, but it is also used to review the proceedings of special
tribunals, commissioners, magistrates, and officers of municipal
corporations exercising judicial powers, affecting the rights or
property of the citizen, when they act in a summary way, or in a
new course different from that of the common law.' '-225
a. Criteria which identify administrative action as quasi-
judicial.
The properties of an act which characterize it as quasi-judicial
are not easily defined and subject to controversy and confusion.
(1) In the first place it must be observed that the qualifying
prefix "quasi" in the adjective "quasi-judicial" which is fre-
quently used in the American cases is a concession to, and neces-
sitated by, the doctrine of separation of powers.
In England, where this constitutional doctrine has no tradi-
tional foothold, the rule is usually stated that certiorari is available
224. The development of English law is discussed by Lord Justices
Bankes and Atkin in the leading case of Rex v. Electricity Commissioners,
Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co., [19241 1 K. B. 171 (C.A.
1923). Lord Justice Bankes stated it as follows: "Originally no doubt the
writ was issued only to inferior Courts, using that expression in the ordinary
meaning of the word 'Court.' As statutory bodies were brought into existence
exercising legal jurisdiction, so the issue of the writ came to be extended to
such bodies." Id. at 193. Lord Justice Atkin used similar language, id. at 205.
The cases which are usually credited with the initiation of this evolution are
Rex v. Inhabitants in Glamorganshire. I Ld. Raym. 580 (1700). and Caqc
of Commissioners of Sewers for Yorkshire, 1 Strange 609 (1724).
225. 32 Minn. 145. 150, 19 N. W. 723. 725 (1884).
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generally to review the exercise of judicial functions by inferior
tribunals, including those designated as special tribunals, and
it is now recognized that any administrative tribunal acting judi-
cially is subject to such control.22 6 ". . .it is not necessary to be
strictly a Court; if it is a tribunal which has to decide rights after
hearing evidence and opposition, it is amenable to the writ of
certiorari .... ",227
't must be admitted that in Minnesota, as well as elsewhere
in the United States, the courts have not succeeded in developing
universally applicable functional criteria (i.e., such that pertain to
the effect, the basis, or the method of the determination) which
permit a differentiation of judicial and quasi-judicial functions.
Negatively it is established that such criteria cannot be found in the
fact alone that the particular determination in question necessitates
226. See, particularly, Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, Ex porte Lon-
don Electricity Joint Committee Co., supra note 2-4.
227. Rex. v. The London County Council, Ex parte the Entertainment
Protection Association [1931] 2 K. B. 215, 233 (C.A.). To prevent an
erroneous impression it should be specifically stated that the notion of a
special category of quasi-judicial functions has also found acceptance in
English case law, official reports and documents and scholarly treatments.
It was developed in the wake of the celebrated decision of the House of
Lords in Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 120 (1914) for
the purpose of establishing judicially enforceable minimum standards of
fairness in certain types of administrative proceedings. Thus the equally
famous Report of the Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932, Cmd. 4060)
differentiated carefully quasi-judicial decisions as a class distinct both from
judicial and purely administrative decisions and saw its distinguishing criteria
in the fact that after having ascertained certain facts involved in a dispute
between parties by means of a formalized procedure the administrative
agency is free to make its final determination thereon according to its
discretion, guided by considerations of public policy (ibid. pp. 73, 74). Al-
though not without grumbling, see for instance Marriott V. Minister of
Health [1936] L. J. K. B. 125, 129 (1935) ; In re City of Plymouth Declara-
tory Order 1946 (1947) K. B. 702, 715 (C.A.), the concept has been adopted
in a number of judicial opinions, see Errington v. Minister of Health 11935]
1 K. B. 249, 266, 271; Cooper v. Wilson [1937] 2 K B. 309, 340 (C.A.) ;
Denby and Sons v. Minister of Health [1936] 1 K. B. 337, 342. The majority
of British students of administrative law have been hostile to the notion.
but recently Prof. W"rade has published an interesting essay in its defense,
"Quasi-Judicial" and Its Background, 10 Camb. L. J. 216 (1949). mainly in
order to soften the severe blow which the doctrine received from the House
of Lords in Franklin v. Minister of Town and Country Planning 119481
A. C. 87 (1947). It should be noted that the English notion of a quasi-
judicial function is on the one hand much more restricted than that accepted
in the United States, since according to English law administrative officers
may sit as truly judicial tribunals and on the other hand embraces functions
which in the U. S. would be characterized as quasi-legislative. In the
absence of special review provisions, certiorari would apparently also be
available in England for the purpose of controlling the legality of the
exercise of quasi-judicial 'functions in the English sense. See the strong
dicta to that effect by Greer, L. J., in Errington v. Minister of Health
[193511 K. B. 249, 265, 266 and the intimations by Viscount Haldane and
Lord Parmoor in the Arlidge Case [1915] A. C. 120, 133, 140: but see also
the reservations in that respect by Lord Moulton, ibid. 149.
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the exercise of judgment or affects individual private rights. Thus
Mr. Justice Dibell in upholding a statute against an attack based
on the claim that it amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of
judicial power stated: "that it [the administrative agency] deter-
mines facts or passes upon questions which may affect parties and
exercises judgment and discretion does not imply that it has judicial
power. -2 28 Similarly Mr. Justice Olsen commented, when dealing
with the same issue: ". . . the power of administrative and execu-
tive officers of the government to hear and determine many matters
more or less directly affecting public or private rights, not being in
the nature of a suit or of an action between the parties, is not the
exercise of judicial power, within the meaning of these constitu-
tional provisions. ' 2 9 The qualification of the latter statement seems
to imply positively that an adjudication of a controversy between
parties amounts to a truly judicial function. But actually this is
not correct. An adjudication is not permanently stamped as judi-
cial rather than merely quasi-judicial by virtue of the fact that the
type of controversy which constitutes its object once belonged
within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of justice. This is
illustrated in Minnesota by the transfer of the workmen's com-
pensation cases in 1921 from the courts to the Industrial Com-
mission without constitutional amendment. This transfer met no
constitutional obstacle and remained unchallenged even after the
transition to the compulsory system in 1937.280 For the same
reason it seems more than questionable whether, as apparently has
been suggested by Mr. Chief Justice Brown, the exercise of a
function can be classified as judicial rather than quasi-judicial in
the constitutional sense because it necessitates resort to "a course
of judicial reasoning. '2 1 On the other hand it cannot be accepted,
228. State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn.
221, 223, 176 N. W. 759, 760 (1920) (statute requiring a certificate from
State Securities Commission for the operation of a bank and specifying the
conditions for issuance thereof).
229. American State Bank v. Jones, 184 Minn. 498, 501, 239 N. W.
144, 145 (1931) (statute authorizing commissioner of banks to place a bank
under specified conditions into liquidation).
230. Apparently the Minnesota Supreme Court has not passed spe-
cifically on that pcint since the 1937 amendment.
231. See State ex rel. Nat. Bond & Security Co. v. Dunn, 88 Minn. 444.
93 N. W. 306 (1903). The case involved the validity and application of a
statute which required the state auditor to authorize the refundment of taxes
whenever a tax certificate presented to him was invalid within the principle of
any supreme court decision. It was held that this act could not and did
not clothe the officer with the power to determine that question by a course
of judicial reasoning and therefore delegated no judicial functions. Never-
theless the case was decided on the merits on certiorari. Whether this is
consistent is somewhat dubious, inasmuch as in a similar case which was
[ Vol. 33:685
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although it was intimated by Mr. Justice Streissguth,12 that there
is a distinction between administrative and judicial trbunals based
on their "nwdus operandi," because the former need not observe the
procedural standards of the common law courts. Because this dis-
tinction, insofar as it exists, is at best a consequence of the existence
of two distinct types of tribunals and not a reason for their differ-
ence. There are, however, functions which have been classified as
quasi-judicial and which, according to strong dicta, nevertheless
could not have been conferred upon the courts of justice. The
typical example of this type is the exercise of the licensing power.
The determination of whether the statutory requisites of fitness,
reasonable public demand, etc., are complied with in the case of a
particular application is in the first instance the performance of a
quasi-judicial function,2 3 which cannot be entrusted to the con-
stitutional courts,2 3 4 although the question of its legal-but not of
its correct--exercise may be the proper subject of a truly judicial
determination. In cases of this type then, 33 both the nature of the
issues to be decided and the content of the final act, vi3., the grant
or the denial of the particular privilege, are differentiating func-
tional criteria. But there are apparently other cases where the only
remaining basis for a distinction between judicial and quasi-
judicial determinations is the tautological and question-begging
ground 36 of the nature of the agency which is entrusted therewith;
i.e., whether the latter is considered as a court in the constitutional
sense or as an administrative agency. It seems to be the law in
Minnesota, in contrast, e.g., to California,237 that the separation
cited as precedent, mandamus was held to be the proper remedy, State ex rel.
Stanchfield v. Dressel, 38 -Minn. 90, 35 N. W. 580 (1887).
232. State er rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 563, 7
N. r. 2d 544, 555 (1942).
233. See the discussion and collection of authorities on this point in
Hunstiger v. Kilian, 130 Minn. 474, 478, 153 N. V. 869. 871 (1915).
234. See State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 .Minn.
221, 226, 176 N. W. 759, 761 (1920).
235. Other cases of this type are the dismissal cases. The determination
whether an employee under the particular circumstances should be dis-
charged in a quasi-judicial question, while the issue whether he validly
could be discharged under given circumstances may be judicial in the con-
stitutional sense. See also State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn.
550, 569, 572, 7 N. W. 2d 544, 557, 565 (1942).
236. Compare the criticism by Jennings, Removal fromn Public Office in
Minnesota, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 721, 740 (1936). It may be noted that even
the differentiation between truly judicial and quasi-legislative or purely ad-
ministrative acts on a strictly functional basis is not alvays easy, State e.r reL.
Young v. Brill, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294, 639 (1907) ; ef. State ex rel.
Board of Commrs. of St. Louis County v. Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 304, 90 N. W.
772, 773 (1902).
237. In California it has been held that in the absence of special con-
stitutional authorization administrative agencies with state-wide jurisdiction
1949]
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of powers doctrine is not violated by any delegation of adjudicatory
functions to an administrative agency, at least as long as judicial
review in a court in the constitutional sense remains open.
It may be added that the nebulous doctrine of the United States
Supreme Court which apparently permits certiorari under the
Federal Judicial Code only with respect to such judicial functions
as are exercised by regular "tribunals, 238 whatever this term may
imply, does not find a counterpart in the Minnesota decisions.
(2) The adjective "quasi-judicial" is used to differentiate the
administrative acts subject to review by certiorari from other types
of administrative acts not subject to such review viz., quasi-legis-
lative and purely administrative, particularly ministerial acts.Y9
The Minnesota law in this respect was likewise chartered by
Mr. Justice Mitchell through his opinion in In re Wilson.
"The acts of municipal corporations, or rather of municipal
officers, are divided into legislative, ministerial, and judicial. Of
course, municipal officers do not, strictly speaking, possess judicial
powers; but they do possess certain powers, in the exercise of
which they perform acts which, both from the nature of the acts
themselves and their effect upon the rights or property of the
citizen, bear a close analogy to the acts of courts, and are, there-
fore termed 'judicial,' or quasi 'judicial,' to distinguish them from
those that are merely ministerial or legislative. The authorities are
cannot be vested with judicial powers and are, therefore, not amenable
to control by certiorari. Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal., 6 Cal.
2d 557, 59 P. 2d 119 (1936) : Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry, 19 Cal.
2d 831, 123 P. 2d 457 (1942). This ruling is criticized in McGovney. Ad-
ministrative Decisions and Court Review Thereof, in California, 29 Calif. L.
Rev. 110 (1941) ; Turrentine, Restore Certiorari to Review State-1U"ide Id-
ministrative Bodies in California, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 275 (1941).
238. Degge v. Hitchcock, 229 U. S. 162 (1913). The decision is actually
based on at least four separable grounds: (a) that the Postmaster General in
refusing mail service to the petitioners, while ". . . he may be said to have
acted in a quasi-iudicial capacity . . . was not an officer presiding over a
tribunal" rendering a judgment, id. at 171 ; (b) that the determination could
be attacked in equity and was thus subject to an adequate remedy: (c) that
certiorari would cause manifest inconvenience; and (d) that review by
certiorari of a decision of the type in question would violate the separation
of powers doctrine.
239. Some Minnesota cases advance the theory that the class of ad-
ministrative acts which are neither quasi-legislative nor quasi-judicial and
consequently purely administrative in nature is not necessarily confined to
ministerial acts, though the latter constitute the great bulk of that class.
See especially State e.r rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550. 569,
7 N. W. 2d 544, 557 (1942). The typical example of these purely administra-
tive acts which are not ministerial are the hiring or discharge of public eni-
ployees or officers, where and insofar as the administrative discretion is
not controlled by any particular substantive or procedural standard. See
State ex rel. Martin v. City of Minneapolis. 138 Minn. 182, 164 N. V. 806
(1917) (denying certiorari). In general see also Oikari v. Indep. School
District No. 40. 170 Minn. 301. 212 N. W. 598 (1927) ; State e.r rel. Ging v.
Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N. W. 2d 544 (1942) ; State cx ret.
Young v. Brill, 100 Minn. 499, 111 N. W. 294, 639 (1907).
[Vol. 33:685
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almost uniform in holding that mere legislative or ministerial acts,
as such, of municipal officers cannot be reviewed on certiorari; that
only those which are judicial or quasi judicial can be thus re-
viewed. "240
It should, however, be noted that the exclusion of quasi-legis-
lative administrative acts from review by certiorari is based solely
on the construction of the scope of the writ in the light of the
common law. There is no constitutional ground which would pre-
vent the legislature from extending the application of the writ to
administrative acts which generally, and for other purposes, may
be classified as "quasi-legislative." The Supreme Court of Minne-
sota has recognized that a limited review in whatever form (ap-
peal, injunction, etc.) by the courts of quasi-legislative acts does
not militate against the doctrine of separation of powers as em-
bodied in the state constitution. Thus, in the leading case of
Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the district courts had power to review, on appeal
from an order of the Railroad and WVarehouse Commission, by
trial de novo the findings of the commission for the purpose of
determining whether or not the rates fixed were so unreasonable
as to be confiscatory, although the court adopted the view that
"The fixing of rates is a legislative or administrative act, not a
judicial one," and that the commission is ". . not a judicial tri-
bunal, but an administrative body, whose powers are somewhat
legislative in their character."2 4' 1 Similarly it has been held that the
district courts had the power, in an action to enjoin the State
Minimum Wage Commission from enforcing a wage order, to
ascertain whether such orders ".... are made without jurisdiction,
or under a mistaken interpretation of the law, or are so arbitrary
and unreasonable that they deprive a party of guaranteed property
rights. 242 The court added the following significant remarks:
"The-scope of review is such as has been announced from time
to time, in cases involving various situations, and often recently,
as in administering statutes enacted under the police power duties
are increasingly cast upon boards and commissions. The cases
following illustrate applications of the principle when relief has
been sought by different appropriate remedies" (italics added) .213
240. 32 Minn. 145, 150, 19 N. W. 723, 725 (1884).
241. 69 Mim. 353, 375-76, 72 N. W. 713, 716 (1897). See also Arrow-
head Bus Service, Inc. v. Black & White D. C. Co., Inc., 226 Minn. 327,
32 N. W. 2d 590 (1948), commenting on the limits of the judicial function in
such cases.
242. Miller Telephone Co. v. Minimum Wage Commission, 145 Minn.
262, 273, 177 N. W. 341, 345 (1920).
243. The court referred to the following authorities: State v. State
Medical Examining Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238 (1884) ; Steenerson
19491
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Apparently no Minnesota statute has actually ever extended
review by certiorari to administrative acts which have been classi-
fied as quasi-legislative. The closest instances in that respect arc
probably the review provisions in the Casualty Insurance and
Surety Rate Regulatory Act and the Fire and Inland Marine In-
surance Rate Regulatory Act which prescribe that "any order or
decision of the commissioner shall be subject to review by writ
of certiorari at the instance of any party in interest."12 4 4 It should
be noted, however, that under these acts technically the commis-
sioner "reviews" the rate filings of the individual carriers or the
approved rating organizations to determine their compliance with
the legislative standards 245-- and does not "make" the rates. The
nature of his functions is, therefore, not completely like that of
the rate making activities of other agencies.
It may be added that the English courts seem to have declined
to recognize a special class of quasi-legislative acts as distinct from
judicial and ministerial acts and applied certiorari to administra-
tive determinations which in the United States might have been




(3) The differentiation of quasi-judicial from purely ministerial
acts which are not reviewable by certiorari 24 7 involves tests which
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713 (1897) ; Diamond
v. City of Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93 N. W. 911 (1903) ; Hunstiger v. Kilian,
130 Minn. 474, 153 N. W. 869 (1915); Brazil v. County of Sibley, 139
Minn. 458, 166 N. W. 1077 (1918) (containing an excellent discussion and
citation of the authorities) ; State v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn.
221, 176 N. W. 759 (1920). For other cases containing at least language to
the same effect see State v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 130 Minn. 57, 153
N. W. 247 (1915); M. & St. P. S. R. Co. v. Village of Birchwood, 186
Minn. 563, 244 N. W. 57 (1932).
244. Minn. Laws 1947, c. 119, § 17(3) ; c. 120, § 16(3).
245. Minn. Laws 1947, c. 119, § 4(3) ; c. 120, § 4(3).
246. See the discussion by Lord Justices Bankes and Atkin in Rex v.
Electricity Commissioners, Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee
Co., [1924] 1 K. B. 171, 197, 209 (C.A. 1923), and, particularly, the statement
of Lord Justice Bankes that "The true view of the limitation would seem to be
that the term 'judicial act' is used in contrast with purely ministerial acts."
Id. at 195. There exist, however, also in England, rare instances of administra-
tive acts which cannot be properly classified as either judicial or ministerial,
and which, consequently, are not subject to control by either certiorari or
mandamus. Examples of this type of case are Reg. v. Hastings Local Board,
6 B. & S. 401 (Q.B. 1865) (involving an administrative ruling which accord-
ing to the controlling statute was intended merely to take the place of the
report by a Parlimentary committee) ; Rex v. Barnstaple Justices, Ex partc
Carder, [1938] 1 K. B. 385 (1937) (involving administrative proceedings
not provided for by any law). See also supra Note 227.
247. See, e.g. State ex rel. Grant v. Iverson, 92 Minn. 355, 100 N. W.
91 (1904) ; State ex, rel. O'Connell v. Canfield, 166 Minn. 414, 208 N. W.
181 (1926), cited in the dissent by Mr. Justice Youngdahl in Zion E. L.




have been discussed in connection with mandamus. Generally
speaking, a duty is quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial and not
ministerial if it involves the exercise of discretion, i.e., an expert
value judgment.2 4 8 The mere necessity of deciding the legality of
certain acts or transactions or the applicability of a statute to a set
of facts as prerequisite for the performance of a duty is not suffi-
cient to make the latter quasi-judicial.2 14 However, it has been held
that a decision by an administrative officer may be quasi-judicial,
and not merely ministerial, although in a particular case "he exer-
cised no discretion in the consideration of evidence, but, upon an
undisputed state of facts, determined what the law was," provided
that his decision a) was made after notice and hearing, b) settled
an actual controversy between different parties and c) affected
substantial legal rights of them.2 50 A determination is likewise not
of a quasi-judicial character and subject to review by certiorari
simply because it depends upon the ascertainment of certain
"facts' as a prerequisite for a correct performance of a statutory
duty.25 ' But if the ascertainment of facts requires a process of
proof which necessitates a certain degree of expertise, such as is
presumed to exist in the ordinary courts, the determinations based
thereon become quasi-judicial, particularly if they are to be made
after notice and a hearing, however cursory and informal. Ordi-
248. See supra at p. 583.
249. This rule was apparently first announced by the supreme court in
a case involving the availability of the writ of prohibition, Home Insurance
Co. v. Flint, 13 Minn. 244 (1868), and has been reiterated in the mandamus
cases cited supra note 83. Its applicability to the writ of certiorari was an-
nounced in Sifnclair v. Com'rs of Winona Co., 23 Minn. 404 (1877); see
also State ex rel Grant v. Iverson, 92 Minn. 355, 100 N. W. 91 (1904)
(statute requiring the state auditor to issue mineral lease on state lands to
applicant complying with certain statutory conditions did not necessitate
the exercise of a quasi-judicial function in respect to questions of title).
250. State ex rel. Board of County Commrs. of St. Louis County v.
Dunn, 86 Minn. 301, 305, 90 N. W. 772, 774 (1902) (involving the decision of
the state auditor determining which of two counties had power to tax relator's
property); see also Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 97 N. W.
454. (1903), holding that the refusal of state auditor to pay bounty under a
statute because he considered it to be unconstitutional was quasi-judicial in
nature and therefore reviewable on certiorari. The correctness of this
decision was subtly questioned by Mr. Justice Lewis in State ex rei. Grant
v. Iverson, supra note 249.
.251. Thus,.in State ex rel. Hardy v. Clough, 64 Minn. 378, 380, 67 N. W.
202, 203 (1896), involving the reviewability by writ of certiorari of pro-
ceedings for the detachment of certain portions of an unorganized county
before a special commission, Mr. Justice Mitchell stated the rule as follows:
"The fact that a board or officer has, in the performance of their duties, to
ascertain certain facts, and in doing so, to determine what the law is, does
not of-itself render its acts judicial. That has to be done every day by public
bodies and'officers, in the discharge of purely legislative or executive acts."
Si-i- Christlieb v. County of Hennepin, 41 Minn. 142, 42 N. W. 930(1889)_....
1949]
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narily in such cases, however, the determinations will involve
value judgments of some kind. Thus, e.g., workmen's compensa-
tion cases will usually not only require the simple ascertainment
of facts, but also value judgments, such as the credibility of wit-
nesses or findings about the causal connection between accident and
injury, degree of impairment of earning power, etc.
(4) The differentiation of quasi-judicial from quasi-legislative
duties for the purpose of determining whether certiorari is avail-
able or not has created the greatest difficulties for the court and
litigants. The difficulties lie essentially in the fact that the quasi-
judicial and the quasi-legislative acts both involve ex hypothesi
the exercise of discretion. Although it is often asserted that legis-
lative and judicial discretion are different in nature or at least in
scope, it would be impracticable if not impossible to develop any
test which is based on this distinction as such. This is especially
true as to the differentiating of quasi-legislative from quasi-judicial
discretion since the former, because of the prohibition against
delegation of powers, must always be fettered by legislative or
common law standards-while the latter may involve expertise
which the judges are thought incapable of possessing.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has apparently been well
aware of these difficulties and endeavored to develop some funda-
mental policy and guiding criteria for the scope of the writ. The
basic judicial labor was performed by Mr. Justice Mitchell in a
number of fairly consecutive opinions.
The earliest and leading of these cases is In re Wilson2 52 which
has been mentioned and quoted from before. It involved an attack
by means of a petition for a writ of certiorari against an ordinance
of the city of Minneapolis which restricted the grant of liquor
licenses to patrol districts to be established by the mayor. The
court, though it denied the writ, announced in an elaborate and
intentional dictum that petitioner was correct in his contention
that the ordinance was invalid because it called for "legislative dis-
cretion" which could not be delegated to the mayor. Mr. Justice
Mitchell took the occasion to enunciate the guiding principles which
should govern the availability of certiorari for the review of the
acts of administrative, and particularly, municipal officers. He
pointed out that ". . . in every case ... where a court has assumed
the right to review the acts of municipal officers on certiorari, either
the act itself was judicial in its nature, or else its validity was in-
volved in judicial proceedings which were the subject of re-
252. See notes 214 and 221 supra.
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view."253 As belonging to the class of acts quasi-judicial in nature
he defined those ". which, both from the nature of the acts
themselves and their effect upon the rights or property of the
citizen, bear a close analogy to the acts of courts .... ,."' The Justice
conceded that- "The courts are not always agreed as to what acts
are judicial," and'that some "have gone a great length in holding
certain acts judicial, which, on principle, it would be very difficult
to place under that head."25 5 But he repudiated the argument that
even the ordinance in question was judicial because "the city coun-
cil must have exercised their discretion in passing it," with the
terse comment, "Every legislative act calls for the exercise of dis-
cretion as to its expediency and propriety." ' 6
In the subsequent decisions Mr. Justice Mitchell watched care-
fully against an extension of the writ to such administrative acts
as the organization of new towns, the formation of school districts,
or the detachment of county territory.2 57 He declared such acts to
be "political or legislative in nature"2 38 and not "proceedings judi-
cial in their nature which affect the citizen in his rights of person
or property. ' 2 59 He justified his holdings with the principle and
policy of judicial self-limitation which should guard the courts
against transcending their legitimate province by assuming super-
visory or advisory jurisdiction. -60 In State ex rel. Hardy v. Clough.-01
Mr. Justice Mitchell sumimed up his views again and redefined the
two properties which determined the quasi-judicial nature of ad-
ministrative acts, vir., their nature and effect on the citizen. He
paraphrased the term "nature" with "the manner of performing
them,"262 and' he defined the requisite effect by the following ex-
planation:
"Neither does it render an act judicial in its nature because it,
in a general sense, affects the relator's interests in common with
253. 32 Minn. at 151, 19 N. W. at 726.
254. Id. at 150, 19 N. W. at 726.
255. Ibid.
256. Id. at 152, 19 N. W. at 727.
257. Lemont v. County of Dodge, 39 Minn. 385, 40 N. W. 359 (1888);
Christlieb v. County of Hennepin, 41 Minn. 142, 42 N. V. 930 (1889):
Moede v. Count of Stearns, 43 Minn. 312, 45 N. W. 435 (1890); State
ex rel. Hardy v. Clough, 64 Minn. 378, 67 N. \V. 202 (1896). The proper
remedy in such cases is the writ of quo marranto. See State ex rel. Childs
v. Board of County Commrs., 66 Minn. 519, 68 N. W. 767, 69 N. W. 925,
73 N. W. 731 (1896).
258. Christlieb v. County of Hennepin, 41 Minn. 142, 42 N. W. 930(1889).
259. Lemont v. County of Dodge, 39 Minn. 385, 40 N. W. 359 (1888).
260. See particularly, Moede v. County of Steams, 43 Minn. 312, 45
N. W. 435 (1890).
261. 64 Minn. 378, 67 N. W. 202 (1896).
262. Id. at 380, 67 N. W. at 203.
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those of other members of the public. It is difficult to conceive of
any legislative or executive act which does not in this way affect
the interests of every member of the community. To render the
proceedings of special tribunals, commissioners, or municipal offi-
cers judicial in their nature, they must affect the rights or prop-
erty of the citizen in a manner analogous to that in which they are
affected by the proceedings of a court acting judicially. '20 3
In application of these principles Mr. Justice Mitchell held
that certiorari was available to a municipal employee who by the
governing city charter could be removed only for sufficient cause
after notice and hearing for the purpose of contesting his dismissal
despite the city's contention that its decision was "quasi politi-
cal.,"2 64
Later decisions by and large have followed the course thus
chartered by Mr. Justice Mitchell and have applied and further
refined his tests. Probably the most important contribution in these
further efforts toward a formulation of the criteria which charac-
terize administrative action as quasi-judicial is the definition enun-
ciated by Mr. Justice Brown in the above mentioned case of State
ex rel. Board of County Commrs. of St. Louis County v. Dunn.' '
After repeating the test laid down in State v. Clough the Justice
added: "It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial
functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are with respect to a matter in controversy; and
whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes
to determine those questions he acts judicially." While this test
was laid down in that case for the purpose of establishing a line
of demarcation between quasi-judicial and ministerial acts, Mr.
Justice Brown also applied it to differentiate quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative functions. Thus the equitable distribution by the
board of county commissioners of certain funds, following a divi-
sion of a school district pursuant to a statutory mandate to that
effect, was held to be quasi-judicial in nature because it determines
the measure of legal rights accorded by the statute even though the
formation of the new school districts is itself a quasi-legislative
matter.2 66 The court sometimes has gone to surprising lengths in
considering a determination to be quasi-judicial in nature rather
than quasi-legislative. Thus, on the one hand, it has been held
that certiorari and not an injunction was the proper method of
263. Ibid.
264. State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N. W.
118 (1893).
265. 86 Minn. 301, 304, 90 N. W. 772, 773 (1902).
266. State ex rel. School Dist. No. 44 v. County Board, 126 Minn. 209,
148 N. W. 52 (1914).
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challenging the legality of a determination by a board of town
commissioners to construct a town ditch across certain private
lands. Mr. Justice Taylor reasoned that while the determination
of the propriety or necessity of constructing a ditch was legislative
in character, the existence of a public purpose was a judicial ques-
tion affecting private rights which was subject to review by cer-
tiorari. 267 On the other hand in a case2 s (which, however, did not
involve reviewability by means of certiorari) it was held that the
decision to compromise certain claims of a city against former
city employees was quasi-judicial and not quasi-legislative and
therefore not subject to the referendum provisions of the city
charter. The court emphasized the necessity of certain factual de-
terminations, and Mr. Chief Justice Wilson stated the controlling
test in the following manner: "The term 'quasi-judicial' indicates
acts of the city officials, which are presumably the product or re-
sult -of investigation, consideration and deliberate human judg-
ment based upon evidentiary facts of some sort commanding the
exercise of their discretionary power. It is the performance of an
administrative act which depends upon and requires the existence
or nonexistence of certain facts which must be ascertained and the
investigation and det rmination of such facts cause the administra-
live act to be quasi-judicial." '69 It is submitted that this last test,
for which no Minnesota precedent was cited, is not in complete
harmony with the line of cases heretofore discussed. Whether it is
explainable and distinguishable on the ground that it was enun-
ciated for a different purpose is difficult to say. At any rate it seems
correct to conclude that the characterization of an act as "quasi-
judicial," for purposes of its reviewability by certiorari, depends
essentially upon functional criteria,2 70 which involve its effect upon
the rights or property of a citizen, the type of judgment to be
made, and the process by which it is reached. It is apparently not
always necessary that these three criteria be simultaneously present.
Thus the necessity of formal proceedings is apparently sufficient
but not necessary to give an act its quasi-judicial character.2 1'
267. Webb v. Lucas, 125 Minn. 403, 147 N. W. 273 (1914).
268. Oakrnan v. City of Eveleth, 163 Minn. 100, 203 N. W. 514 (1975).
269. Id. at 108, 203 N. W. at 517.
270. See the statement by Collins, J., in Mfinnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson,
91 Minn. 30, 33, 97 N. W. 454, 455 (1903) : "The character of the office or
tribunal does not determine the question, but, rather, the nature of the
act performed."
271. State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127 Mim. 155, 149 N. W. 11(1914) (where city charter permits removal of officers only for cause
though not requiring a formal trial, a discharge may be reviewed by certiorari
where the employee was neither advised of the charges against him nor
accorded an opportunity to answer them).
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(5) The determination whether a function is quasi-judicial or
not does not depend upon what the officer has assumed to do but
what he is required to do.2 72 Accordingly a decision remains re-
viewable on certiorari despite the fact that the officer rendering
the same failed completely to follow the procedure required by law.
"The extent of the deviation is not material. The writ lies even
if the action was arbitrary and without jurisdiction and void.""'
Conversely, if a statute or charter does not confer any quasi-
judicial function of the type in question upon an officer, an usurpa-
tion thereof cannot be challenged or remedied on certiorari.2 7 4
b. Application of the test and criteria developed by the cases dis-
cussed.
Certiorari is now well established as the proper method of
judicial review in a number of typical categories of administrative
determinations. Thus it is recognized that ordinarily the refusal2 "
or revocation 27 of professional or occupational licenses or cer-
tificates required for other business activities of various types
can and should be reviewed in that manner, although under ex-
ceptional circumstances mandamus2 "7, or injunction7 8 may be avail-
able and more suitable because of the broader scope of review.
Similarly the proper allocation, classification, or declaration of
status of public employees or officers under civil service, 27" as
272. State ex rel. Grant v. Iverson, 92 Minn. 355, 360, 100 N. W. 91,
92 (1904).
273. State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127 Minn. 155, 162, 149 N. W.
11, 14 (1914).
274. State ex rel. Mansfield v. Mayor of St. Paul, 34 Minn. 250. 25
N. W. 449 (1885) (no review on certiorari of the revocation of a license at-
tempted by city mayor where city council had no power to delegate such
authority) ; State e.r rel. Holden v. Village of Lamberton, 37 Minn. 362, 34
N. W. 336 (1887) (certiorari will not lie to review wholly unauthorized re-
canvassing of election results and grant of a liquor license as a result of such
determination).
275. State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn.
221, 176 N. W. 759 (1920) ; State ex rel. Saari v. State Securities Commis-
sion, 149 Minn. 101. 182 N. W. 910 (1921) ; State ex rel. Hardstone Brick
Co. v. Dept. of Commerce, 174 Minn. 200, 219 N. W. 81 (1928) ; Zion E. L.
Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 21 N. W. 2d 203 (1945)(dictum) ; cf. Hunstiger v. Kilian, 130 Minn. 474, 538, 153 N. W. 869, 1095
(1915).
276. State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425, 147 N. W.
820 (1914) ; State ex rel. Colberg v. Jensen, 205 Minn. 410, 286 N, W. 305
(1939) ; State ex rel. Peterson v. City of Alexandria, 210 Minn. 260, 297 N. W.
723 (1941) ; Walker v. Corwin, 210 Minn. 337, 300 N. W. 800 (1941) ; Dehning
v. Marshall Produce Co., 215 Minn. 339, 10 N. W. 2d 229 (1943) ; see also
National Cab Co. v. Kunze, 182 Minn. 152, 233 N. W. 838 (1930).
277. See Zion E. L. Church v. City of Detroit Lakes, supra note 275 and
the discussion of this problem in the section on mandamus supra.
278. National Cab Co. v. Kunze, supra note 276.
279. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Ernest, 197 Minn. 599, 268 N. W. 208
(1936) ; State ex rel. Butters v. Elston, 214 Minn. 205, 7 N. W. 2d 750
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well as the legality of their dismissal under tenure rules in city
charters, veterans' preference acts, etc.,2 0 is regularly reviewable
on certiorari, although-apart from the writ of prohibition2 1-
under certain conditions mandamus proceedings for reinstate-
ment,2 2 collateral attack by action for salary,2-82 or quo warranto"'I
may be a proper or, perhaps, the only available remedy to test the
validity of a discharge. Certiorari is furthermore available to ob-
tain review of administrative orders seizing business enterprises
because of specified public purposes28 5 or the administrative estab-
lishment of roads, ditches, etc., under special statutes if and insofar
as it involves a taking of private property for public purpose as
long as there is no other adequate remedy or method of attack. -8
(1943) ; State ex reL Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 32
N. W. 2d 574 (1948).
280. State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of the City of Duluth, 53
Minn. -238, 55 N. W. 118 (1893) ; State cx rcl. Zimmennan v. City of St.
Paul, 81 Minn. 39, 84 N. W. 127 (1900) ; State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart,
116 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857 (1911) ; State c.x rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127
Minn. 155, 149 N. W. 11 (1914) ; State ex rel. Nelson v. Board of Public
Welfare, 149 Minn. 322, 183 N. W. 521 (1921) ; In re Application for Re-
moval of Nash, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N. W. 570 (1920); State cx rel.
Sudheimer, 164 Minn. 437, 205 N. W. 369 (1925); State ex rel. Pete v.
Eklund, 196 Minn. 216, 264 N. W. 682 (1936) ; State ex rel. Lund v. City
of Beniidji, 209 Minn. 91, 295 N. W. 514 (1940) ; State ex reL. Rockwell v.
State Board of Education, 213 Minn. 184, 6 N. W. 2d 251 (1942). Of course
in the absence of any tenure the dismissal cannot be questioned by certiorari
as a matter of substantive law. State ex rel. Martin v. City of Minneapolis,
138 Minn. 182, 164 N. W. 806 (1917) ; Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 209
Minn. 67, 295 N. W. 406 (1940) (demotion); see also Jennings, Removalfrom Public Office in Minnesota, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 721 (1936).
281. State ex rel. Brandt v. Thompson, 91 Minn. 279, 97 N. W. 887
(1904).
282. See the discusaion in the text to footnotes 111 ff.
283. See, e.g., Egan v. City of St. Paul, 54 Minn. 1, 55 N. W. 864(1894); Parish v. City of St. Paul,.84 Minn. 426, 87 N. W. 1124 (1901);
Sykes v. City of Minneapolis, 124 Minn. 73, 144 N. W. 453 (1913) ; Oikari V.
Independent School District, 170 Minn. 301, 212 N. W. 598 (1927) ; Backie
v. Cromwell Consolidated School Distr. No. 13, 186 Minn. 38, 242 N. NV.
389 (1932) ; and cases cited supra note 136.
284. State ex rel. Childs v. Dart, 57 Minn. 261, 59 N. W. 190 (1894);
State ex rel. Douglas v. Meegarden, 85 Minn. 41, 88 N. W. 412 (1901) ; State
ex rel. Village of Chisholm v. Bergeron, 156 Minn. 276, 194 N. W. 628 (1923).
285. In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Airport, 226 Minn. 272. 32 N. W.
2d 566 (1948) (acquisition of airport by metropolitan airports commission
pursuant to Minn. Laws 1947, c. 363, §§ 15, 19). But in American State
Bank v. Jones, 184 Minn. 498, 239 N. W. 144 (1931), Mr. Justice Olsen
suggested that a decision of the commissioner of banks to place a bank into
liquidation, though quasi-judicial in character, could be reviewed by injunction.
286. State cx rel. Utick v. Board of County Commrs. of Polk County,
87 Minn. 325, 92 N. W. 216 (1902) ; State ex rel. Wickstrom v. Board of
County Commrs., 98 Minn. 89. 107 N. W. 730 (1906) ; State ex rel. Ross v.
Posz, 106 -Minn. 197, 118 N. W. 1014 (1908) ; State ex rel. Hunt v. City of
Montevideo, 135 Minn. 436, 161 N. W. 154 (1917); see also Bilsborrow v.
Pierce, 101 Mimi. 271, 112 N. W. 274 (1907) (injunction proper under the
particular circumstances although certiorari would also be available):
Schumacher v. Board of County Commrs., 97 Minn. 74, 105 N. W. 1125
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Certiorari is also now by statutory mandate the proper remedy to
obtain a review by the supreme court of decisions of the Board of
Tax Appeals. 28s Formerly it was held that certiorari would not lie
against a decision of the Minnesota Tax Commission or other
taxing authorities if there existed an adequate possibility of review
in the enforcement proceedings.2 8 It may be added finally that
administrative determinations of claims for workmen's compensa-
tion and unemployment benefits are likewise reviewable by cer-
tiorari, although again express statutory provisions to that effect
dispense with the necessity of relying on general principles. 89
2. Necessity of a sufficient interest of relator in the matter which
forms the subject of the quasi-judicial function.
In an early case involving a petition for certiorari by a tax-
payer to review the proceedings of a village council which granted
a liquor license after illegally recanvassing the results of the elec-
tion under the local-option law the supreme court quashed the
writ, among other reasons, because the relator as taxpayer and
resident had not a sufficient peculiar interest in the matter in
question. The opinion stated that relator's interest as taxpayer and
resident was, under general principles, not enough to entitle him
to a judicial review and correction of the official action of public
officers.
29-0
Vhen it became established under the rule of State ex rel.
(1906) ; Webb v. Lucas, 125 Minn. 403, 147 N. W. 273 (1914) ; Heller v.
Schroeder, 182 Minn. 353, 234 N. W. 461 (1931) (injunction is not available
in such cases because certiorari will lie). But a determination to undertake
a public improvement cannot be attacked in certiorari proceedings, if it
can be reviewed judicially at the stage of the enforcement of the correspond-
ing assessment. State ex rel. Brown v. City of Red Wing, 134 Minn. 204, 158
N. W. 977 (1916).
287. 1 Minn. Stat. § 271.10 (1945), construed in Strange & Lightner v.
Commissioner of Taxation, 36 N. W. 2d 800 (Minn. 1949); Village of
Aurora v. Commissioner of Taxation. 217 Minn. 64, 14 N. W. 2d 292 (1944) ;
Duluth Superior Dredging Co. v. Comm'r of Taxation, 217 Minn. 346, 14
N. W. 2d 439 (1944) ; Village of Hibbing v. Commissioner of Taxation, 217
Minn. 528, 14 N. W. 2d 923 (1944).
288. State ex rel. Hennepin Hold. Co. v. Minnesota Tax Com., 135
Minn. 282, 160 N. W. 665 (1916) ; State ex rel. Brown v. Board of Public
Works of City of Red Wing, 134 Minn. 204. 158 N. W. 977 (1916). But
certiorari has been granted and the controversy decided on the merits. State
ex rel. St. Paul City Ry. Co. v. Minnesota Tax Commission, 128 Minn. 384.
150 N. W. 1087 (1915) ; State e.r rel. Inter-State Iron Co. v. Armson, 166
Minn. 230, 207 N. W. 727 (1926). See also State c.r rel. City of Ely v.
Minn. Tax Com., 137 Minn. 20, 162 N. W. 675 (1917). For certiorari to re-
view a county auditor's proceedings in a tax assessment, see State ex rel.
Vossen v. Eberhard, 90 Minn. 120, 95 N. W. 1115 (1903) [overruled on the
substantive law by State v. O'Connell, 170 Minn. 76, 211 N. V. 945 (1927) 1.
289. 1 Minn. Stat. §§ 176.61, 268.10(8) (1945).
290. State ex rel. Holden v. Village of Lamberton, 37 Minn. 362 (1887)
followed in State cx rel. Sammons v. Nelson, 136 Minn. 272, 159 N. NV. 758.
161 N. W. 576 (1916).
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Board of Co. Coinnirs. v. Dunnz9' that a criterion for the quasi-
judicial character of administrative action was that it affected
"substantial legal rights" of relator, this test became simultaneous-
ly the determinative standard for the requisite interest in the
relator..2 9 2 In order to be a "proper relator" it is not necessary that
relator was made a formal party in the administrative proceedings,
it suffices that'he was a "party in substance," i.e., that the particu-
lar determination affected a legal right and did not produce merely
damnum absque injuria.93 A mere economic interest by relator in
the matter of the administrative proceedings, however, is not suffi-
cient, even if it was recognized by the administrative tribunal as
sufficient to give him the opportunity to present argument. Thus,
in the recent case of In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Airport, an
aviation corporation was held not to be entitled to a writ of cer-
tiorari to review a decision of a metropolitan airports commission
to take over an airport owned by another aviation corporation.
The court pointed out that according to the record relator did not
own any of the surrounding property and that neither its "active
participation in aviation" nor "its appearance and participation in
the public hearing, coupled with its status as a taxpayer" made it
a party to the proceeding such as would be entitled to review.29"
Even where relator possesses a sufficient legal interest in the
subject he can question the legality of an administrative decision
only insofar as it directly affects this interest.295 The interest must
subsist until the time of the final decision on the writ. If the ques-
tion has become moot the writ will be discharged. -"G It is no longer
necessary to plead affirmatively good faith. If the facts stated show
a meritorious case and a prima facie right to the writ, good faith
will, in the absence of anything to the contrary, be presumed. 2 --
291. See supra text to note 265.
292. Cf. State ex rel. Ross v. Posz, 106 linn. 197, 199, 118 N. NV. 1014,
1015 (1908): "The remedy is appropriate in all such cases, where the sub-
stantial legal rights of the applicant have been so far invaded as to
prejudicially affect him if the proceeding or judgment remains unreversed."
293. State ex rel. Wickstrom v. Board of County Commrs.. 98 Minn.
89, 107 N. W. 730 (1906) ; followed in Bilsborrow Y. Pierce, 101 Minn. -71,
274, 112 N'. W. 274, 276 (1907).
294. In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Airport, 226 Minn. 272. 275,
276, 32 N. W. 2d 560, 563 (1948).
295. See State ex rel. Sammons v. Nelson, 136 Minn. 272, 159 N. W.
758, 161 N. W. 576 (1916) (in judicial ditch proceedings owner may attack
proceedings only insofar as his own land is affected, while illegality of the
assessment against the village can be raised by him only in proceedings in-
stituted by village to tax his land to pay for the village assessment).
296. Debning v. Marshall Produce Co.. 215 Minn. 339, 10 N. \V. 2d 229
(1943) ; State ex rel. Bennett v. Brown, 216 Minn. 135, 12 N. W. 2d 180(1943).
297. State cx rel. Ross v. Posz, supra note 292.
1949]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
3. Absence of an adequate remedy.
It is established in a long line of cases that certiorari is not
available to review the decision of an administrative board if and
insofar as the relator is entitled to appeal ;218 while of course the
converse is not true and the mere absence of an appeal by itself
is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to make any ad-
ministrative order reviewable on certiorari.299 Since certiorari it-
self is in the nature of an appeal30° the reason for that rule is
perfectly self-evident.
It is likewise well recognized that the existence of any other
adequate method of review or legal remedy will exclude the writ
of certiorari. 301 Some difficulties exist in regard to the question as
to what remedies or other methods of review will be considered
as adequate in comparison with the writ of certiorari.
Apparently review by certiorari is not precluded by the fact
that relator may question the validity of administrative determina-
tion collaterally by an action at law either for salary, -02 etc., or for
damages against the officials responsible therefor.308
The relationship of certiorari to mandamus which is fraught
with doubts and uncertainties has been discussed before.3 0 4 The
other writs cause little trouble, since prohibition fulfills the func-
tion of certiorari at an earlier stage305 and quo warranto offers
little possibility of conflict with certiorari.
No case has held or suggested that certiorari might be un-
available because plaintiff could seek relief by injunction, although
conversely the possibility of the writ of certiorari will ordinarily
298. See, e.g., Webb v. Lucas, 125 Minn. 403, 147 N. W. 273 (1914)
State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425, 147 N. W. 820 (1914):
State ex rel. School District No. 44 v. County Board, 126 Minn. 209. 148
N. W. 52 (1914) ; State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127 Minn. 155. 149 N. W.
11 (1914) ; State ex rel. Hunt v. City of Montevideo, 135 Minn. 436. 161
N. W. 154 (1917), 142 Minn. 157, 171 N. W. 314 (1919): Heller v.
Schroeder, 182 Minn. 353, 234 N. W. 461 (1931).
299. See State ex rel. Hardy v. Clough, 64 Minn. 378, 380. 67 N. W.
202, 203 (1896) ; State ex rel. Grant v. Iverson, 92 Minn. 355, 361. 100 N. W.
91, 92 (1904).
300. State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, supra note 298; Johnson v.
City of Minneapolis, 209 Minn. 67, 295 N. W. 406 (1940).
301. See for instance State ex rel. Board of County Commrs. v. Dunn,
86 Minn. 301, 90 N. W. 772 (1901) ; State ex rel. Ross v. Posz. 106 Minn.
197, 118 N. W. 1014 (1908) ; State ex rel. Brown v. City of Red Wing. 134
Minn. 204, 158 N. W. 977 (1916); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of
Public Works of St. Paul, 27 Minn. 442. 8 N. W. 161 (1881).
302. See supra note 283.
303. Cf. the reasoning in State e.r rel. Wickstrom v. Board of County
Commrs. of Isanti County, 98 Minn. 89, 107 N. W. 730 (1906).
304. See supra p. 596.
305. See Bankes, L. J., in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924] 1
K. B. 171, 206 (C.A. 1923) and infra, next section.
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cause a denial of relief by injunction 3o6 unless the limited scope of
review by certiorari permits a different result under particular
circumstances.307
Certain difficulties have arisen in Minnesota in regard to the
question of how far administrative determinations to establish cer-
tain improvements to be financed by assessment or decisions by
tax authorities can be attacked by the taxpayer directly on cer-
tiorari rather than subsequently and collaterally in the tax en-
forcement proceedings. It is now settled that certiorari will not lie
insofar as relator is permitted to raise the same issues in the en-
forcement proceedings. 08
4. Necessity of finality and possibility of correction.
Lastly, to be reviewable on certiorari an administrative deci-
sion must be final and not merely of an interlocutory nature. 0 3
5. Special constitutional limitations on the availability of cer-
tiorari or on certain issues raised in such.
Similarly to the principles controlling the functional scope of
mandamus the supreme court recognizes now that the separation
of powers doctrine does not curtail the power of the courts to issue
writs of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing quasi-judicial deci-
sions of the governor and other constitutional officers constituting
the executive department.310
Likewise in accordance with the rules governing mandamus
proceedings it is possible for administrative officers to resort to
certiorari proceedings for the purpose of asserting the unconstitu-
306. Schumacher v. Board of County Commrs., 97 Minn. 74, 105 N. W.
1125 -(1906) ; Webb v. Lucas, 125 Minn. 403, 147 N. W. 273 (1914) ; State
ex rel. Hunt v. City of Montevideo, 135 Minn. 43, 161 N. NV. 154 (1917);
Heller v. Schroeder, 182 Minn. 353, 234 N. V. 461 (1931).
S307. Bilsborrow v. Pierce, 101 Minn. 271, 112 N. W. 274 (1907);
National Cab Co. v. Kunze, 182 Minn. 152, 233 N. W\r. 838 (1930). Sometimes
the court has failed to take account of the problem. Thus in the Alexander Co.
v. City of Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N. W. 2d 244 (1916), it %%as held
that plaintiff could not enjoin the city from prohibiting plaintiff from cutting
the curb in front of his building. Plaintiff had made an application to the
city council and the latter had rejected the same after a public hearing pur-
suant to the City Ordinance. The court did not discuss whether plaintiff
should have proceeded by petition for writ of certiorari rather than for
injunction.
308. State ex rel. Sammons v. Nelson, supra note 295; State ex rel.
Brown v. City of Red Wing, 134 Minn. 204,158 N. V. 977 (1916) ; State cx rtl.
Hennepin Hold. Co. v. Minnesota Tax Commission, 135 Minn. 282, 160 N. W.
665 (1916) ; Saxhaug v. County of Jackson, 215 .Minn. 490, 10 N. W. 2d 722
(1943).
309. Anderson v. Pyramid Granite Co., 218 'Minn. 194, 15 N. W. 2d 523(1944).




tionality of a statute forming the basis of the quasi-judicial adjudi-
cation, if public interest requires such action-"
B.
POWERS OF THE COURT ON CERTIORARI
(SCOPE OF REVIEW)
1. Discretion of court in granting the writ.
There exists language in a Minnesota case to the effect that it
rests in the discretion of the court whether a writ should be grant-
ed.312 But actually the courts seem to grant the writ as a matter
of course if the administrative determination in question is of such
nature that it is subject to review by certiorari and if relator has
a legitimate interest in such review and cannot resort to another
adequate or even more effective remedy.
2. Scope of review.
The scope of review on certiorari has formed the subject of
a great number of not always consistent statements by the mem-
bers of the Minnesota Supreme Court. Actually, however, the dif-
ferences seem to be reducible to a matter of formulation and, some-
times, lack of caution, rather than to a real and substantial disagree-
ment.
a. Character and limits of review in general.
It was settled in this state at an early date that the power of
the courts on certiorari varied in several important respects from
those exercised by the English courts under the common law writ.
On the one hand at common law the office of the writ was not
always restricted to the purpose of review but was also used to
remove causes into king's bench for new trial '" whereas in Minne-
sota the writ is strictly a corrective, not a preventive, remedy, 1 4 in
the nature of a writ of error"' or appeal. 316 On the other hand
311. Loew v. Hagerle Brothers, 226 Minn. 485, 33 N. W. 2d 598 (1948).
312. State ex rel. Ross v. Posz, 106 Minn. 197, 118 N. W. 1014 (1908).
313. See the statement by Mr. Justice Mitchell in Grinager v. Town
of Norway, 33 Minn. 127, 128, 22 N. W. 174 (1885).
314. Cf. Grinager v. Town of Norway, supra note 313; State ex rel.
Tolverson v. District Court for Jackson County, 134 Minn. 435, 159 N. W.
965 (1916); Bilsborrow v. Pierce, 101 Minn. 271, 274, 112 N. W. 274, 275
(1907). See also the wording of 2 Minn. Stat., § 606.01 (1945).
315. Grinager v. Town of Norway, mpra note 313; State e.r rel. Nordin
v. Probate Court, 200 Minn. 167, 169, 273 N. W. 636, 637 (1937).
316. State cx rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425, 427, 147
N. W. 820, 821 (1914) ; State ex rel. Nordin v. Probate Court, supra note
315. Accordingly it has been held in some cases that the jurisdiction exercised
on certiorari, whether by the district courts or the the supreme court, is
technically appellate and not original, and that even where the writ lies to an
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certiorari is in this state a certiorari with increased scope or a
proceeding merely "in the nature of a certiorari,"317 both with re-
spect to the type of decisions reviewable on certiorari318 and the
scope of review.
The basic rules indicating the scope and the limits of review
on certiorari were announced in early cases319 and firmly anchored
into Minnesota law by Mir. Justice Mitchell. In the leading case
of State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of City of Duluth he
stated :
"Some courts, restricting the writ to its original common law
office, hold that it brings up for review only the record, and not
the evidence and hence that they will not look into the evidence
at all, but merely inspect the records, to see whether the inferior
tribunal had jurisdiction, and had not exceeded it, and had pro-
ceeded according to law .... Other courts hold that the evidence
may be brought up, not for the purpose of weighing it, to ascertain
the preponderance, but merely to ascertain whether there was any
evidence at all to sustain the decision of the inferior tribunal,-
whether it furnished any legal and substantial basis for the deci-
sion. The latter is the doctrine of this court as to the office of
certiorari."3
20
From this statement which essentially still represents the au-
thoritative exposition of the Minnesota law it can be seen that the
scope of review and the powers of the court are essentially limited.
Their review is confined to the record in the larger sense ' 1 and
considers only "the legal aspect of facts appearing on the rec-
ord. '32 2 The court on certiorari can only reverse an erroneous
decision of the administrative tribunal and remand for purposes of
proceeding under the correct theory; it can neither, as with man-
damus, order the officer to actually perform a particular act nor,
as in injunction proceedings, restrain him from acting in a par-
administrative tribunal. See Pierce v. Huddleston, 10 Minn. 131 (1865);
Goar v. Jacobson, 26 Minn. 71, 1 N. W. 799 (1879) relating to district
courts, and Lading v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 464, 190 N. W. 981 (1922) ;
State ex rel. Pete v. Eklund, 196 Minn. 216, 264 N. WV. 682 (1936) ; Larson
v. LeMere 220 Minn. 25, 18 N. W. 2d 696 (1945) relating to the supreme
court. Note, however, the inconsistent dictum in the Lading case that in
remedial cases the jurisdiction on certiorari may be original (quaere).
317, Minnesota Central R. R. Co. v. McNamara. 13 Minn. 508, 513
(1868).
318. See supra, section 1.
319. See particularly Minnesota Central R. R. Co. v. McNamara, supra
note 317.
320. 53 Minn. 238, 242, 55 N. W. 118, 119 (1893).
321. Record in the larger sense includes the matters listed by Mr.
Justice Mitchell in the Common Council of Duluth case, supra note 320, and
even to acts in whicli a record in that sense is totally lacking, but required
by law, State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl. 127 Minn. 155, 149 N. AV. I1 (1914).




ticular way.323 Only if the proceedings are consolidated with man-
damus can a different result be accomplished. 324
On certiorari the court cannot look dehors the recordA, - \Vhile
the scope of the return in response to the writ has been enlarged
in accord with the increased scope of review in Minnesota and
embraces now a certification of the record, the proceedings in the
nature of the record, the rulings of the inferior tribunal and the
evidence, the return of the administrative board is conclusive and
cannot be impeached by outside evidence.3 26 The reviewing court
may require a further return, if the command of the writ is not
fully complied with,3 27 but it may not make findings or determine
questions of fact.3 28 This applies also to the question whether re-
lator is a proper party, i.e., a party in substance. 25 The courts
have, however, held that these limitations on the review will not
prevent them, in a proper case, from considering all legal ques-
tions presented by the record.3 '0
These limitations on the scope of review on certiorari may,
under particular circumstances, constitute a considerable weakness
or defect in this method of judicial review of administrative action
in comparison with other methods. Ordinarily, it is true, the scope
323. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550.-589,
7 N. W. 2d 544, 564 (1942) ; State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board,
226 Minn. 240, 251, 32 N. W. 2d 574, 582 (1948) ; see also Minnesota Sugar
Co. v. Iverson, 91 Minn. 30, 34. 97 N. W. 454, 455 (1903) ("We can merely
review his determination at this time, and, if found erroneous, another and
further remedy must be discovered by the petitioner") ; Bilsborrow v. Pierce.
101 Minn. 271, 274, 112 N. W. 274, 275 (1907) ("Nor does it enable the
court . .. by a proper mandate to carry its findings into effect").
324. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 32
N. W. 2d 574 (1948).
325. State ex rel. Roberts v. Hense, 135 Minn. 99, 104, 160 N. W. 198,
200 (1916) ; see also In the Matter of the Petition of Johnson, 150 Minn.
524, 184 N. W. 214 (1921) ; State ex rel. Butters v. Elston, 214 Minn. 205,
211, 7 N. W. 2d 750, 753 (1943) ; Zion E. L. Church v. City of Detroit Lakes,
221 Minn. 55, 64, 21 N. W. 2d 203, 208 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
326. State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425, 147 N. W.
820 (1914); followed in State ex rel. Peterson v. City of Alexandria, 210
Minn. 260, 297 N. W. 723 (1941); In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Air-
port, 226 Minn. 205, 32 N. W. 2d 560 .(1948).
327. State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, supra note 326.
328. State ex rel. Butters v. Elston, 214 Minn. 205, 212, 7 N. W. 2d 750,
753 (1943) ; State ex rel. Spurek v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn.. 240, 32
N. W. 2d 574 (1948).
329. In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Airport, 226 Minn. 205. 32 N. W.
2d 560 (1948) ; State ex rel. Wickstrom v. Board of County Commrs. of
Isanti County, 98 Minn. 89. 107 N. V. 730 (1906).
330. State ex rel. Butters v. Elston, 214 Minn. 205. 212, 7 N. \V. 2d
750, 753 (1943). See also State ex rel. Beise v. District Court. 83 Minn. ,64.
466, 86 N. W. 455 (1901) ("if there were questions of law improperly decided.
such may be considered under the return . . . we are not included to coll-
sider . . . the objection to our right of review in that respect too strictly
against petitioners") ; Schumacher v. Board of County Comm'rs. 97 Minn. 74.
76, 105 N. WV. 1125 (1906).
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of judicial review of administrative action will not vary, regard-
less whether methods of direct attack such as appeal or certiorari,
methods of collateral attack such as injunction"3 . or action for
damages, or finally methods of incidental attack such as defenses
in enforcement proceedings are resorted to. Mr. Justice Dibell
emphasized this point in two noteworthy opinions with copious
citation of authorities. 332 But where the propriety of an ad-
ministrative judgment but not the correctness of its exercise is in
question the presentation of factors outside the records may be
desirable but possible only in mandamus, 333 injunction,3 ' or, ap-
parently, also in tax enforcement proceedings.3 35
b. Matters reviewable on certiorari.
(1) Classes of errors correctible. Generally speaking it can be
said that the courts will review the record for all errors deductible
therefrom except a) those which might be committed in the for-
mation of judgments as to the existence or non-e-xistence of facts,
supporting or ultimate, if and insofar as they are made rationally
on the basis of substantial probative evidence, and b) those which
pertain to the evaluation of such facts with reference to correctly
interpreted legal standards.
It has become customary to group the errors thus reviewable
into four or five classes. Thus the leading Minnesota case in point
laid doivn the rule that the reviewing court ... can interfere only
when it appears that the commission has not kept within its juris-
diction, or has proceeded upon an erroneous theory of the law, or
unless its action is arbitrary and oppressive and unreasonable so
that it represents its will and not its judgment, or is without evi-
dence to support it."336 A recent case adds a fifth class, vi3. ir-.
regularity of the proceedings. 37
331. See particularly Diamond v. City of Mankato, 89 Minn. 48, 93
N. W. 911 (1903); The Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 226 Minm. 312,
329, 24 N. W. 2d 244, 255 (1946). For injunction as method of collateral at-
tack, see Schumacher v. Board of County Comm'rs, supra note 330.
332. State ex tel. Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn.
221, 176 N. W. 759 (1920) ; Miller Telephone Co. v. Minimum Wage Com-
mission, 145 Minn. 262, 177 N. W. 341 (1920).
333. See the dissent by Youngdahl, J., in Zion E. L. Church v. City of
Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 21 N. W. 2d 203 (1945), discussed supra in
the section on mandamus.
334. Bilsborrow v. Pierce, 101 Minn. 271, 112 N. W. 274 (1907).
335. Cf. State ex rel. Brown v. City of Red Wing, 134 Minn. 204, 158
N. W. 977 (1916).
336. State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Securities Commission, 145 Minn. 221,
225, 176 N. W. 759, 761 (1920), quoted with approval in many cases, eg.,
recently in Stronge & Lightner Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 36 N. W.
2d 800 (Minn. 1949).
337. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 571, 7
N. W. 2d 544, 556 (1942).
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While these four or five classes appear at first blush to be
simple, clear and easily applied, closer analysis shows that they are
vague, have blurred boundaries, and shade into one another. This
holds time in the first place in respect to the class of defects which
is ascribed to the error that the determination was made in an
excess of jurisdiction. On the one hand it should be recalled that
some early cases held that an administrative agency may act "so
completely" outside its jurisdiction that the determination is no
longer quasi-judicial and therefore not reviewable on certiorari. "
But subsequent cases have at first asserted distinctions' " ' and later
seemingly ignored the precedents by declaring that the extent of
the deviation of an administrative determination from the re-
quired legal standards is immaterial for purposes of reviewability
on certiorari.340 On the other hand not every erroneous determina-
tion is in itself in excess of jurisdiction. Administrative tribunals,
like other courts have the power to err within certain litnits. ' 4
The location of these limits is not clarified by using the term
jurisdiction which, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has observed3 4 2 is
one of the most deceptive legal pitfalls; besides it would be utterly
confusing to consider every judicially correctible error of an ad-
ministrative tribunal as committed in excess of jurisdiction. 3
The class of "defects in procedure" shades without clear lines
of demarcation both into the category of errors called excess of
jurisdiction and into that labelled arbitrariness and capricious-
ness. 344 The latter in turn shades into the class formed by the
absence of substantial evidence"" and has caused troubles by pro-
338. State ex rel. Mansfield v. Mayor of City of St. Paul, 34 Minn.
250, 25 N. W. 449 (1885); State ex rel. Holden v. Village of Lamberton,
37 Minn. 362, 34 N. W. 336 (1887), discussed supra text to note 274.
339. Cf. State ex rel. Ross v. Posg, 106 Minn. 197, 118 N. W. 1014 (1908).
340. State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, 127 Minn. 155. 162. 149 N. W.
11 (1914): "In all cases where the writ is invoked there is some alleged
deviation from the requirements of the law. The extent of the deviation is
not material. The writ lies even if the action was arbitrary and without juris-
diction and void."
341. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 571. 7
N. W. 2d 544, 556 (1942) quoting from Lindquist v. Akkett. 196 Minn.
233, 240, 265 N. W. 54, 57 (1933). A similar statement was made by Mr.
Chief Justice Stone in Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1. 14 (1914) : "Juris-
diction to decide is jurisdiction to make a wrong as well as a right decision."
342. Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 686, 695 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
343. Yet Mr. Justice Peterson wrote recently in State ex rel. Spurck v.
Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 253, 262, 32 N. W. 2d 583, 588 (1948) : "An
administrative agency has no power or jurisdiction (I) to make findings
for which there is no evidentiary support."
344. See State ex rel. Furlong v. McColl, supra note 340, in which the
agency failed completely to follow the controlling discharge procedure.
345. See State ex rel. Lund v. Bemidji, 209 Minn. 91, 96, 295 N. W.
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ducing an ill-defined overlapping of mandamus and certiorari." 6
The decisions have been fairly generous in regard to the ex-
tent that administrative errors due to an incorrect application of
the law will be corrected by the courts. Theories and interpretations
as to the proper bases of computation3 4 7 or proper causes for a
discharge are included.3 48
(2) Absence of evidence to support a finding in particular. The
class of reviewable errors described as absence of evidence to sus-
tain a finding deserves particular attention. It should be noted that
Mr. Justice Mitchell who first defined this category paraphrased
any evidence as evidence which furnishes "any legal and substantial
basis for the decision."149 Minnesota consequently follows tie so-
called substantial evidence rule. This follows also from Mr. Justice
Dibell's statement of the controlling principles which has become
the accepted rule: "The province of this court in reviewing pro-
ceedings brought before it by writ of certiorari is well defined. It
may examine the evidence, but only for the purpose of ascertaining
whether it furnished any reasonable or substantial basis for the
decision. It cannot reweigh the evidence for the purpose of deter-
mining where the preponderance lies, nor substitute its judgment
as to the credibleness of the testimony of a witness for that of the
tribunal charged with the duty of determining the facts" (italics
added).350 "Unfortunately"; as Dean Stason in a celebrated article
discussing the "substantial evidence" rule has correctly observed,311
"the term does not lend itself to expression by a simple formula.
There are sporadic expressions in some cases which border danger-
514, 516 (1940), where the lower court had characterized the absence of
evidence as "arbitrary and oppressive and unreasonable."
346. See the discussion of the Zion E. L. Church case supra in the sec-
tion on mandamus.
347. State cx rel. Beise v. District Court, 83 Minn. 464, 86 N. W.
455 (1901).
,348. State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of Duluth, 53 .Minn. 238,
244, 55 N. W. 118, 120 (1893) ; State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Board of
Education, 213 Mlinn. 186, 6 N. IV. 2d 251 (1942).
349. See the quotation from State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council of
Duluth in the text to note 320.
350. In re-Application for Removal of Nash, 147 Miinn. 383, 388, 181
N. W. 570, 572 (1920). It should be noted that the Iinnesota court, in
contrast to some other jurisdictions, has not qualified the rule with respect
to so-called "jurisdictional" facts. Consequently the substantial evidence
rule applies with equal force to all facts regardless of whether other juris-
dictions would classify them as jurisdictional or even quasi-jurisdictional
and re-weigh the evidence in respect to them. A possible reservation may,
however, be necessary because-of the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to
so-called constitutional facts, particularly such bearing on a possible con-
fiscatory effect of an administrative adjudication.




ously close to the now discarded scintilla rule, if they do not go
beyond that." Thus Mr. Justice Bunn stated that administrative
findings are conclusive even if the evidence "is clearly and palpably
against the decision. 3 52 And in a recent case the power of the court
to reverse an administrative agency seems to be restricted to the
cases "where there is no evidence to support an administrative
finding or the evidence as a matter of law compels a finding con-
trary to the administrative one, as where the evidence was all one
way and the administrative agency found to the contrary." 53 The
most elaborate discussion of the various formulae used by the court
is contained in the case of State ex rel Pete v. Eklund, in which
Mr. Justice Olsen arrived at the short and workable test of "evi-
dence reasonably sufficient to sustain the . . . findings. .. .
While this definition was made in view of the wording of a
particular statute a generalization was suggested as possible and
later accepted. 55 The formula implies that the evidence sustaining
the finding must be "competent," i.e., endowed of a rational, pro-
bative force. 5 '
It may be observed in conclusion, that sometimes the particular
status of a party, such as that of the injured worker in compensa-
tion cases, requires, according to the cases, a review of findings
in his favor "in the light most favorable to such findings"; but
actually this rule does not dispense with the requirement that the







1. Jurisdiction of the supreme court and the district courts.
Jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari is vested in the
supreme court 58 and the district courts.359 The latter obtained their
352. State ex rel. City of Ely v. Minnesota Tax Comm., 137 Minn. 20,
23, 162 N. W. 675, 676 (1917).
353. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 249.
32 N. W. 2d 574 (1948). Contra: Amundsen v. Poppe, 34 N. W. 2d 337
(Minn. 1948) (findings "manifestly contrary to the evidence" will be dis-
turbed).
354. State ex rel. Pete v. Eklund, 196 Minn. 216, 219, 264 N. W. 682,
684 (1936).
355. Hughes v. Department of Public Safety, 200 Minn. 16, 25, 273
N. W. 618, 623 (1937).
356. Cf. Hughes v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 355.
357. Larson v. Le Mere, 220 Minn. 25, 29, 33, 18 N. W. 2d 696, 699,
701 (1945).
358. 2 Minn. Stat. § 480.04 (1945).
359. 2 Minn. Stat. § 484.01 (1945).
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jurisdiction in 1881360 and retained it, except for a brief interruption
due to a legislative oversight, until the present.3 0'
A number of statutes provide expressly that the review of de-
cisions of certain administrative tribunals with state-wide jurisdic-
tion shall be had on certiorari by the supreme court.302 In the ab-
sence of such provision the petition for the writ for the purpose
of reviewing an administrative order should normally be directed
to the district court. The supreme court will take jurisdiction in
such cases only when general public interest requires immediate
determinatio.33
2. Parties to the proceedings.
It has already been discussed that in order to be a proper
relator the petitioner must be a formal party to the administrative
proceedings or a party in substance, identifiable as such by the
return.36 4 Adverse parties, upon all of whom the writ must be
served to effect a valid review,3 65 are all persons who would be
prejudiced by a reversal or modification of the administrative de-
termination, and all parties thus served are brought before the
court.368 In administrative proceedings the tribunal which renders
the decision also frequently represents the public interest adverse
to the relator. In such case not only is the writ of certiorari di-
rected to it for the purpose of bringing the proceedings up for
review, but it is also an adverse party who may appeal from a
decision of the district court reversing its decision. In that respect
it has a substantially different position from that of a court in
certiorari proceedings. Mr. Justice Mitchell who first laid down
this rule in a case concerning the establishment of school districts
gave the following reason for that distinction: "The court or judge
360. See supra text to note 354. The statute was passed as a result of
the decision in Goar v. Jacobson, 26 Minn. 71, 1 N. W. 799 (1879).
361. See supra note 354; Schultz v. Talty, 71 Minn. 16, 73 N. W. 521
(1897).
362. See, e.g., 1 Minn. Stat. § 80.27 (commerce commission and com-
missioner of securities), § 176.61 (industrial commission), § 268.10(8) (direc-
tor of the division of employment and security), § 271.10 (board of tax
appeals, construed in Stronge & Lightner Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 36
N. W. 2d 800 [Minn. 1949]), § 298.09(3) (commissioner of taxation) (1945).
363. State exr rel. Grubbs v. Schulz, 142 Minn. 112, 171 N. W. 263
(1919) (revocation of teacher's certificate by state superintendent of educa-
tion). For a recent instance where the supreme court issued the writ, see
Dehning v. Marshall Produce Co., 215 Minn. 339, 10 N. W. 2d 229 (1943)
(record does not show an allegation in the petition to the effect that public
interest required determination by the supreme court).
364. See supra text to notes 293, 294.
365. 2 Minn. Stat. § 606.02 (1945); Supreme Court Rules, rule II;
cf. Larson v. Le Mere, 220 Minn. 25, 18 N. W. 2d 696 (1945).
366. Larson v. Le Mere, supra note 365.
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in the case supposed has no representative capacity, but is merely
the tribunal by whom the rights of others have been determined.
But the board of county commissioners is the representative of the
county or the public to which is entrusted the matter of forming
new school districts ... as public interests require. The public has
a special interest in the establishment . . . of these districts, and
we think that the board of county commissioners, to whom that
matter is entrusted, is, as the representative of the public in that
regard, a party interested in and aggrieved by the order of the
court reversing and setting aside their action and therefore has the
right of appeal." ' 7 It is consequently the proper practice in such
case not only to name the administrative board as the tribunal to
which the writ is directed, but also as the adverse party in the
title of the proceedings.38 8
3. Practice on certiorari.
The statute contains very few special provisions relating to the
practice in certiorari proceedings. 6 9 The most important one is
the requirement that the writ must issue and be served on the
adverse party within sixty days after relator has been notified of
the decision to be reviewed, unless a special statute provides other-
wise.3 70 The supreme court rules add littleY71 The leading case
discussing the nature of certiorari proceedings in Minnesota is
Johnson v. City of Minneapolis.372 The case involved the appeal
from an order of the district court affirming a determination of
the civil service commission which demoted relator and which was
brought to review by the writ. The court had merely affirmed the
administrative decision and made no order for entry of a judgment.
On appeal the supreme court held that the practice followed was
correct and that the entry of a formal judgment was not required
nor permitted. It declared that certiorari is not an "action" within
the meaning of 2 Minn. Stat. § 605.09(1) (1945), since the action
was not "commenced" in the district court or "brought there from
another court," but rather the cause had its origin before the ad-
ministrative tribunal. The opinion stressed the fact that certiorari
as used in Minnesota, is not the common law writ, but rather
367. Moede v. County of Stearns, 43 Minn. 312,45 N. W. 435 (1890).
368. The title accordingly would be State of Minnesota ex rel .... v.
... Board.
369. 2 Minn. Stat. c. 606 (1945).
370. 2 Minn. Stat. §§ 606.01, 606.02 (1945).
371. Supreme Court Rules II, III.
372. 209 Minn. 67, 295 N. W. 406 (1940), followed in State ex rel.
Ging v. Board of Education, 213 Minn. 550, 7 N. W. 2d 544 (1942).
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a writ in the nature of certiorari, and that it is in its very nature
and purpose an appeal-a review to correct order. Consequently
proceedings thereon are "special proceedings" within the meaning
of 2 Minn. Stat. § 605.09(7) (1945).
The final order on the merits in such proceedings should ordi-
narily either affirm the administrative decision below or vacate
the same, and, where appropriate, remand for further proceed-
ings3 , not inconsistent with the order. The final disposition may be
different when mandamus and certiorari proceedings in related
matters are consolidated.374
The final order, on certiorari, shall decide the cause as of the
date of that decision. If the controversy has become moot or the
writ cannot be obeyed because the tribunal to which it is directed
has ceased to exist, the writ should be quashed or discharged.- 5
[To be continued]
373. See State ex rel. Sptirck v. Civil Service Board, _6 Minn. 240, 251,
32 N. W. 2d 574, 581 (1948).
374. Ibi.
375. Dehning v. Marshall Produce Co., 215 Minn. 339, 10 N. W. 2d 229(1943) ; State ex rel. Bennett v. Brown, 216 Minn. 135, 12 N. W. 2d 180(1943)_; State ex rel. Anderson v. Soldiers Bonus Board, 162 Minn. 251,
202 -N. W. 444 (1925).
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